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Abstract
The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis showed that despite reported as ‘healthy’ financial institution prior to 
crisis had indeed suffered many problems including liquidity during the crisis. Thus, there is confusion on the
healthy financial institutions, leading to loss of confidence on the overall stability of the banking system. Thus, 
there is an urgent need to review the current measures of financial as well as banking stability. This paper aims to 
look at the definition of ‘stability’ used in the academic researches and by different regulatory bodies, like 
International Monetary Fund, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) and central banks in selected 
countries with dual banking systems. It is then, critically review indicators used as measures of financial as well as 
banking stability.  This review is hope to identify areas of strengths as well as weaknesses of the current measures 
of stability and serves as foundation for further research in future.
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1 Introduction
The financial sector has undergo several crises and the recent 2007 crisis, known as ‘Global 
Financial Crisis’ (GFC) is considered the worst crisis in history.  GFC has threaten the stability 
of banking sector and financial sector in general.  The result of GFC was bank bailouts and 
worst the failure of several financial institutions like Lehman Brothers. There was loss of 
confidence and confusion as to what constitute a stable financial institution.  The reported as 
seemed ‘healthy’ financial institution prior to the crisis, had indeed suffered failure during the 
crisis. There is also puzzle as to whether the Islamic banking is shielded from the crisis. 
Various survey of the literatures and news revealed that neither conventional banks nor Islamic 
banks were spared from financial crisis.  For example, during the GFC, Federal deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported that in the United States of America, the percentage of
failure banks was 26%. The GFC was also affecting Arcapita Bank BSC of US, which was 
formerly known as the First Islamic Investment Bank. In late 2009, the problem in Nakheel 
sukuk has triggered ‘Dubai Debt Crisis’.
It is interesting to note that these crises happened despite the adoption of so-called state of 
the art regulation and methodologies.  A focus on bank stability is thus motivated as a result of 
these crises happened despite banking sector are in fact heavily regulated. The issue of bank 
stability is thus motivated both from academic and a policy perspective. Financial and banking 
stability have been the centre of academic debate since the crisis with many researches 
focusing on the area.(Creel, Hubert, & Labondance, 2014; Swamy, 2014; Segoviano & 
Goodhart, 2009; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche, 2010; Čihák and Hesse, 2010). 
Another reason of motivation is banking and financial stability is in its nature as a public good, 
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being non-rival good since the usage of its goods does not prevent other from accessing the 
same good and it is non-exclusivity good since the usage of the good does not deprive other 
from using it.(Creel et al., 2014).
Thus, the objective of this paper is to survey the bank stability measures critically, 
evaluating the effectiveness and weaknesses of the measures. It is noted that the current 
measure of stability of banks are through various measures such as previously Basel I, II and
later Basel III introduced by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of Bank for 
International Settlements, CAMELS ratio introduced by International Monetary Funds, various 
measures by individual central banks and academician’s usage of z-score as a proxy of banking 
stability.  Nevertheless, the finding of this review is that there is no internationally accepted 
framework and also uniformed measures of financial and banking stability adopted by banks 
around the world especially for financial system with different types of banks.  Thus, this give 
rise to future research on the need of a measure of the bank stability especially for countries 
having both the Islamic and conventional banks in their financial system. The need to measure 
and compare between healthy and potential troubled banks could save the financial sector from 
experiencing another crisis.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discussed the methodology 
used in this paper. Section 3 discussed the definition of financial stability and banking stability, 
drawing the different between the two.  Section 4 survey and critically analysed the banking 
stability measures based on principle-based and theoretical based measures.  Lastly the 
conclusion is drawn in section 5.
2 Research Methodology
The method used in this paper is basically review of literatures to include journal articles and 
also selected countries’ financial stability reports based on availability.  The countries are
selected based on the criteria of having both the Islamic and conventional banks in the financial 
system, or called ‘dual banking’ system. From the list of 18 countries with dual banking 
system, only 11 countries are selected in as the samples of the studies. The reason is these 
countries’ total asset is above 0.5 percent of total global Islamic banking asset, according to 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). These 11 selected countries with dual banking 
countries and total asset is above 0.5 percent of the global Islamic banking asset, are Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
United Arab Emirates. It is also following Alam (2012) that the samples selected are these 11 
countries.
3 Definition of banking and financial stability and its framework
Banking stability and financial stability have neither been properly defined nor agreed upon its 
definition among researchers or regulatory.(Segoviano & Goodhart, 2009; Gersl & Hermanek, 
2010; Schinasi, 2004;Creel et al., 2014;Swamy, 2014). There is also no widely accepted on the 
measure, aggregate indicators and quantification that can be agreed as a measure of financial or 
banking stability or instability.(Segoviano & Goodhart, 2009;Gersl & Hermanek, 2010).  
According to Gersl & Hermanek, (2010), though if there is agreement on the definition of 
financial stability, the construction of indicators for aggregate financial stability is still at the 
infancy stage.  In many research papers, the word financial stability and banking stability is 
used interchangeably. This is a result of absence of consensus and widely accepted model of 
financial stability Swamy (2014) as well as  difficulty in measuring and defining financial 
Norzitah et al.
61
stability.(Schinasi, 2004;Creel et al., 2014;Swamy, 2014). Like what has been indicated by 
Allen & Wood (2006), it is paramount importance to define something with public policy 
objective because the right definition ensure the right policy been identified and implemented. 
Thus, it is important to define banking stability, financial stability and the different between the 
two, in light of this.
Before the financial and banking stability is defined, it is also useful to compare to other 
similar concept of stability, like price stability. Is definition of banking or financial stability the 
same as economic definition of price stability? Price stability is defined in economic as the 
price of general goods changes very slowly or does not changed at all, over time. Since, 
banking or financial stability would not tolerate on absence or slow incremental growth as 
growth is viewed as the most desired consequences of the industry. Thus, the understanding of 
this price stability is definitely not the understanding of stability of bank nor financial. So, what 
constitute the proper definition of bank stability? According to Gadanecz & Jayaram (2009), 
unlike price stability, financial stability is not easy to define or measure given the 
interdependence and the complex interactions of different elements of the financial system 
among themselves and with the real economy. This view of inter-relatedness of banking and 
financial stability is supported by Swamy (2014), and stresses on the importance on 
differentiating banking from financial stability.  This inter-relatedness is also evidence in the 
definition by ECB (2007) that defines financial stability as a condition of financial system, 
which consists of banks, markets and market infrastructure, able to absorb the likelihood of 
financial shock, and mitigate the shocks in the banking processes.
Having said that the financial stability is very much related to banking stability as well as 
other components of financial system, a review of literatures revealed various definitions of 
financial stability. Nevertheless the themes on the definition are almost the same. The common 
themes on definition of financial stability are ability to absorb or withstand shocks (see, for 
example Schinasi, 2004;Allen & Wood, 2006;Petrovska & Mihajlovska, 2013;Houben, Kakes, 
& Schinasi, 2004;Popovska, 2014;ECB, 2013;Czech National Bank; National Bank of 
Belgium, 2014), financial solvency (Allen & Wood, 2006), liquidity (Allen & Wood, 2006)
and free from financial distress (Segoviano & Goodhart, 2009). According to Schinasi (2004), 
financial stability is defined in term of bank’s ability to “to facilitate and enhance economic 
processes, manage risks, and absorb shocks over time, along a continuum rather on over a 
static condition.” Whereas, Houben et al. (2004) defines financial stability in terms of its ability 
to help the economic system allocate resources, manage risks, and absorb shocks, again over a 
continuum, changeable over time and consistent with multiple combinations of its constituent 
elements.
Most of the central banks of selected countries with dual banking system, defines financial 
stability in the context of withstanding the financial shocks. This is evident in their financial 
stability reports. The Central Bank of Kuwait defines financial stability as the resilience of the 
financial system to unanticipated adverse shocks. Similarly, the Central Bank of United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) defines financial stability as a state of financial system in steady state to 
perform its key functions and able to continue in the event of shocks.
In addition to this report of countries with dual banking, the theme for definition of 
financial stability by other central banks also reveal almost the same finding. Petrovska & 
Mihajlovska (2013) noted that the first Financial Stability Report for 2006 prepared by the 
National Bank of the Republic Macedonia, the financial stability is defined as the requirement 
for smooth operation of all segments of the financial system, with each of them providing the 
highest possible level of flexibility to absorb potential shocks. Other Central Bank like the ECB 
defines financial stability as a condition in which the financial system is capable of 
withstanding shocks, thereby reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the financial 
intermediation process, which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of 
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savings to profitable investment opportunities (ECB, 2013). Similarly, Central Bank like The 
Czech National Bank defines “financial stability as a situation where the financial system 
operates with no serious failures or undesirable impacts on the present and future development 
of the economy as a whole, while showing a high degree of resilience to shocks”. According to 
Popovska (2014), Financial stability may be disturbed both by processes inside the financial 
sector leading to the emergence of weak spots, and by strong shocks. Such shocks may arise, 
among other things, from the external environment, domestic macroeconomic developments, 
and the position of the main debtors and creditors of financial institutions, economic policies or 
changes in the institutional environment.(Popovska, 2014).  Other central bank like the 
National Bank of Belgium (2014) defines financial stability as trying to contain the build-up of 
systemic vulnerabilities over time and preventing as well as mitigating the structural systemic 
risks arising through vulnerabilities such as interlinkages between financial intermediaries, 
concentration of institutions’ exposures and the critical role they play in key markets, which 
can render them too important to fail. 
Nevertheless, other similar themes are also included in defining financial stability.  
According to Allen & Wood (2006), the definition of financial stability is more of taxonomic, 
classifying into different aspect of financial like financial solvency and liquidity. According 
Allen & Wood (2006) also defines financial stability as “a property of an economic system 
which is not prone to episodes of financial instability, dampening of perturbation, such as 
unexpected event, shock, unforeseen development or the unexpected failure, rather than 
amplifying it to larger in size and magnitude”. In addition, the financial stability is defined and 
analysed by Segoviano & Goodhart (2009) from three different areas namely “common” 
distress in the banks of the system, distress between specific banks and distress in the system 
associated with a specific bank.
Having defining the financial stability, it is important to understand banking stability in 
view of financial stability, before the measures of banking or financial stability are analysed.  
According to Swamy (2014), the financial stability is a by-product of stability conditions 
prevailing in the banking system, financial markets and real economy, and he draws a 
paramount important of banking stability to the financial stability because at the micro level, 
the stability of banking system is dependent on asset capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings 
and liquidity of the individual banks. Moreover, according to Popovska (2014) the situation of 
the banking sector are typically considered as major determinants of the financial stability. This 
is also supported by Hartmann, Straetmans, & Vries (2005) that the important sector of the 
stability of financial system is the banking sector. Popovska (2014) further explained that the 
financial stability in the developed economies is mainly determined by the condition of non-
banking financial institutions (investment funds, pension funds, private equity funds, brokerage 
houses etc.), unlike, in developing countries where stock exchanges, investment funds, pension 
funds and insurance companies are underdeveloped, and where investments rely on the 
traditional bank loans, banks are the main pillar of financial stability and overall stability of the 
economy.
4 Banking and financial stability measures
Having understand the important of definition of financial and banking stability, in this section, 
the measures of financial and banking stability are critically reviewed based on literature and 
regulatory practices.  To simplify the discussion, the measures are divided into two namely 
principle-based measures and theoretically based measures. Basically, the principle-based 
measures are not supported by any theory but more of favourable measures adapted and/or 
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adopted by the regulator practitioners.  While, as suggested by the name, the theoretical-based 
measures are supported and developed from a theory or principle in the area of finance. 
4.1 Principle-based measures of bank stability
The principle-based measures looks at the measures provided by regulator practitioners such as 
International Monetary Fund, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and Central Banks of 
countries with dual banking system. This will be discussed in the next section.
4.1.1 Financial Services Indicators by International Monetary Fund
Historically, according to Roman & Şargu (2013) and Christopoulos, Mylonakis, & 
Diktapanidis (2011), in 1979, the bank regulatory agencies used financial ratios based on 
CAMEL to assess the soundness of banks in USA.  Later, these are extended and used as a tool 
to assess the soundness of banks for the supervisor authorities from different countries.(Roman 
& Şargu, 2013). International Monetary Fund (IMF) measures financial vulnerability and 
soundness, using handful indicators of Financial System Soundness with acronym CAMELS 
indicators signifies five major sections of a bank namely Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management quality, Earnings ability and Liquidity.(Roman & Şargu, 2013) Nevertheless, it 
has been extended to include the sixth component "S", so that the CAMEL approach became 
the CAMELS approach, which to include the sensitivity of the bank to the changes in the 
market. (Roman & Şargu, 2013). This ‘S’ captures the sensitivity of market to include interest 
rate, foreign exchange and inflation risk which in overall capture the system risk.(Gasbarro, 
Sadguna, & Zumwalt, 2002). This CAMELS becomes the regulatory bodies monitoring 
instruments and also bank’s evaluation of its performance.(Roman & Şargu, 2013).  The IMF 
and the World Bank recommends the usage of CAMELS as the indicator for financial 
soundness of the banking sector, according to Roman & Şargu (2013) and measures of current 
health of financial institution.(IMF, 2000). Nevertheless, it is to note that many regulatory 
bodies do not disclose this CAMELS rating to public nor to the bank itself for the reason of 
avoiding systemic bank crisis.(Roman & Şargu, 2013).  It should be noted that though these 
indicators are measure of the past problems, or backward looking, IMF (2000) acknowledge 
that these ratios have some impact on the current situations and thus useful indicators of the 
current health of the financial system. 
The International Monetary Fund in 2000 produced a report entitled ‘Macroprudential 
Indicators of Financial System Soundness’ and indicated the importance of financial system 
soundness rather than the financial stability. However, the intention of the report is to produce 
indicators of financial soundness that contribute to a more stable and efficient financial system 
that is resilience to financial contagion in future.  These indicators consisted of two main 
categories namely aggregated microprudential indicators and macroeconomic indicators or 
exogenous indicators.  The aggregated microprudential indicators are also known with 
acronym CAMELS and market-based indicators.  The macroeconomic indicators are economic 
growth, balance of payment, inflation, interest and exchange rate, lending and price boom, 
contagion effect and other factors.  In the recent year, the IMF produces report called ‘Global 
Financial Stability Report (GFSR)’ twice a year, every April and October of every year.  The 
following discusses the CAMELS indicators in brief.
The first indicator according to IMF (2000) is capital adequacy, which measure the 
robustness of financial institutions over the shocks to their balance sheets. If the ratios has a 
trend of declining over the years, then it may signal that there is an increased in risk exposure 
as well a possible capital adequacy problems. Bank capital is made of various elements which 
differ in term of availability and capability to absorb losses thus, IMF (2000) good indicators of 
bank’s ability to withstand losses.
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The second indicator is assets quality which tend to confirm the reliability of capital 
adequacy.(IMF, 2000). The asset quality indicator should reflect the current state of credit 
portfolio and credit risk associated with the asset.(IMF, 2000).  The indicators should also 
include off-balance sheet for items like guarantees, contingent lending arrangements, 
derivatives, possibly, trust activities and operations of offshore banks, if there is deliberate 
credit risk effect on the portfolio of assets.(IMF, 2000).  These indicators should include 
sectoral credit concentration, foreign currency denominated lending, non-performing loans, 
loan outstanding to loss making public sector entities, risk weighted asset to total asset and 
household indebtedness as these may signal area of vulnerability or exposure of the banks and 
also imply a higher credit risk.(IMF, 2000).  The overall decreasing in trend for these indicators 
may signal a deterioration in the quality of credit portfolio, possibly affecting the cash flows, 
net income and solvency of the bank.
The third indicator is management soundness indicators, which measure the quality of 
management of the bank. The indicators for management soundness include expense ratios, 
earning per employee an expansion in the number of banks.(IMF, 2000). The expense ratio and 
earnings per employee indicate the operating efficiency of the banks, affecting the profitability, 
though may not necessarily due to management defect.(IMF, 2000).
The fourth indicator is earning and profitability.  While declining trends in profitability 
signaling on risk of insolvency, abnormal high profitability is the sign of excessive risk 
taking.(IMF, 2000). The proxies for profitability are return on assets, return on equity and 
expense ratios.(IMF, 2000). The return on equity reflects the average return investors get from 
holding bank capital.(IMF, 2000). However, a high ratio may indicate both high profitability as 
well as low capitalization, and a low ratio can mean low profitability as well as high 
capitalization.(IMF, 2000). Thus, caution should be taken in interpretation of this ratio.
The fifth indicator is liquidity, which cover on the funding sources such as interbank, 
central bank credit and maturity mismatch. IMF view the macro level of liquidity in the 
financial system rather than at the banking level.  According to IMF (2000), the high central 
bank credit to banks signify severe liquidity or solvency problem whereas high spread of 
interbank rates signal that the banks are risky.
The final indicator is sensitivity to market risk which involve some aspect of market risk 
due to diversification.  In general, the market risk are interest rate, foreign exchange risk and 
prices of commodity.(IMF, 2000). High foreign borrowing could signify the high vulnerability 
and exposure to the changes in the exchange rate as well as interest rate risk in the foreign 
land.(IMF, 2000). The commodity price risk involve in the investment of commodity as the 
price of the commodity generally is more volatile than interest or exchange rate.(IMF, 2000).
4.1.2 BASEL by Basel Committee for Banking Supervision of Bank of International 
Settlements
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) under Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), was established in 1974, with the aim to close the gaps in international 
supervisory coverage in order to ensure all banks including foreign is properly supervised and 
the supervision is adequate and consistent across member jurisdictions.  The aim of Basel is to 
have uniform and standardised regulation among member jurisdictions.  The regulation, known 
as Basel Accord has no legal force and acts as a recommendation to the central banks of the 
member jurisdictions.  
As at current, there are at least 3 Basel initiatives issued, as a mean to promote a more 
resilient banking sectors.  This is basically with the intention to achieve the stability in banking 
system. The first Basel is known as Basel Accord or Basel I which was introduced in July 
1988. It was introduced following the Latin America debt crisis that increase concern over the 
Norzitah et al.
65
capital ratio of international banks. It was recommended for members to maintain a minimum 
capital ratio at 8% by end of 1992. It was initially recommended for G10 countries but later 
extended to member jurisdiction with active international banks.  In Nov 19991, there is 
amendment to the Basel I with the additional item of general loan-loss reserves to be included 
in the definition of capital adequacy ratio. In addition, the credit and market risk were 
introduced in the assessment in the later amendment. A careful evaluation of Basel I revealed 
that Basel I could be the cause of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.(Montgomery, 2005)
investigated that the implementation of Basel I, increasing core regulatory capital from 4% to 
8%, was rather strict and drastic for Japanese banks with international activities but lax on the 
banks with domestic activities only. This strict and drastic capital requirement caused Japanese 
banks to alter their portfolio, adjusting the various risk weight categories of assets to total and
core regulatory capital, which basically causing them to review and pulling out risky assets 
from Asia countries.(Montgomery, 2005). It was noted that Japanese banks was the largest 
provider of investment and debt in Asia, with 60% of its total debt was in Asia while was the 
largest recipient of the debt.(Brana & Lahet, 2009). According to Brana & Lahet (2009), the 
implementation of Basel I caused the decrease in lending from the emerging country like 
Japan, that later caused a pro-cyclicity of credit crisis. In other word, as a result of the 
implementation of Basel Accord I, the Japanese experienced cyclical crisis that caused a 
contagion or systemic effect on Asian countries, on what is later known as the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. (Montgomery, 2005;Brana & Lahet, 2009). As a conclusion on Basel Accord I, 
the implementation of capital requirement ratio was not only failed to reduce frequency of 
banking crises but caused the domestic credit crunch and stirred the financial crisis in the Asian 
countries, causing more economic slowdown.(Brana & Lahet, 2009).  The other critique on 
Basel Accord I was that it only recognize credit risk exposure as the important element of risk 
equation (Panagopoulos & Vlamis, 2009) and ignoring other risks like market risk, operation 
risk and internal as well as external risk.
As a result of the discrepancy in the Basel Accord I, the BCBS issued an improved 
measure, in June 1999, called Basel II. It was supposed to improve regulatory capital 
requirements reflecting the underlying risks of the banking system.  Basel II introduced 3 
pillars which the first pillar is on the minimum capital adequacy, which include refining the 
calculation of regulatory capital into choices of 3 different methods of calculation. This include 
granular approach to credit risk weight, choice of method to calculate method of different risk 
types and incorporating operating risks into the calculation.  The second pillar is on the 
supervisory review of capital adequacy, which include the supervisory to assess the risk profile 
to the required regulated capital ratio.  The third pillar is on the disclosure requirement, which 
to banks are required to disclose their method of calculation of capital and the risk management
process.  
The main criticisms by (Goodhart, Hofmann, & Segoviano, 2004; Kashyap & Stein, 2004;
Goodhart, Hofmann, & Segoviano, 2006;Gordy & Howells, 2006; Heid, 2007; Saurina, 2008), 
on Basel II even before the occurring of 2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is on the pro-
cyclicality inherent in the capital adequacy requirement and the regulatory system of Basel II 
itself and after 2009 GFC by (Terry, 2009) and (Andersen, 2011). According to Goodhart et al. 
(2004), the pro-cyclical effects of Basel II on economic activity that could amplify and prolong 
the macroeconomic fluctuations.  This pro-cyclicality is due to method adopted is fair-value-
accounting, point-in-time rating and advanced internal rating based (IRB) that are inherent in 
Basel II.(Goodhart et al., 2004).  It is believed that the greater is the accuracy of current 
valuation, the greater is the resulting in pro-cyclicality of regulation.(Goodhart et al., 2004).  
Terry (2009) reiterated that regulatory capital under Basel II would be pro-cyclical as it will 
increase during the period of recession and decrease in the period of strong economic growth.  
Terry (2009) also criticised this Pillar I of Basel II where the capital adequacy is highly 
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correlated with risk exposure, and there is a concern that this lead to sudden downgrading in 
the capital adequacy in Australia, as it was historically been maintained at high ratio. In 
addition to pro-cyclicality, criticism by Panagopoulos & Vlamis (2009) highlighted that the 
regulated capital adequacy should be more risk-sensitive and include models of credit risk 
quantification and systems of internal credit risk rating. This is also supported by Terry (2009)
where capital adequacy based on value at risk (VAR) is not adequate to reflect the credit risk. 
The second criticism is on the scope of Basel II.  As Panagopoulos & Vlamis (2009) focus on 
real estate issue in banking, they noted that Basel II has limited coverage on real estate without 
mentioning of methods of valuation and has apply the same risk treatment though for different 
types of property companies with different underlying risk.  The third criticism is on the Pillar 
II where the stress test should cover wider scope. Finally, the criticism on the disclosure 
requirement should include all securitisation and off-balance items in order to reflect the full 
view of the overall bank’s total risks.
The Basel III was introduced in July 2009, with the aim to raise the resilience of banking 
system by strengthening and improving the consistency of the regulatory capital framework
and improve disclosure requirement across jurisdictions, based on the foundation of three 
pillars of Basel II.(Basel Committee On Banking Supervision, 2010).  The improvement was 
on the additional layer of common equity, countercyclical capital buffer, leverage buffer, 
liquidity requirements with later two modifications on the liquidity coverage ratio and net 
stable funding ratio. It is said that Basel III signifies the paramount important strengthening 
the capital rules underlying banking operations, aimed at preventing the severity of contagion 
crisis. (Rossignolo, Fethi, & Shaban, 2013)
Chalermchatvichien, Jumreornvong, & Jiraporn (2014) investigates the association among 
bank risk-taking, ownership concentration and Basel III. They found that higher ownership 
concentration promotes risk-taking. In addition to this, Dermine (2015) look at the Leverage 
Ratio and the impact of credit risk diversification on the probability of bad loan and insolvent 
banks. They found that the capital relief which induced by increase in diversification and lead 
to higher probability of bank run. Dermine (2015) also criticises that the risk weighted capital 
is too complex and complicated and this could lead to potential manipulation with optimization 
of risk-weighted assets. King (2013) investigates the trade-offs between liquidity regulation on 
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), bank risk and profitability. They found that bank involve 
in riskier activities or liquidity creation. This actually lead to the criticism of Basel III where 
Basel III does not target market liquidity as it increases the cost of intermediation, change 
demand for asset with specific characteristics.
In term of implementation of Basel III in the selected countries with dual banking system, 
from 11 countries, only 5 countries, namely Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Turkey and United Arab 
Emirates, mentioned the stage of adoption of Basel III in their Financial Stability Report.  
Basically, these 5 countries have started implementing as early in Jan 2014. However, the full 
implementation is still in progress for all these 5 countries.  The details of the implementation 
is as below, in Table 1.
Table 1 Adoption stage of Basel for selected countries with dual banking system
Country Adoption of Basel III Sources
Kuwait Since Dec 2014. (Central Bank of Kuwait, 2014)
Malaysia Starting and implementation from 1 June 2015. (Central Bank of Malaysia, 2014)
Qatar Since Jan 2014. Ongoing in stages. (Qatar Central Bank, 2014)
Turkey Implemented early 2015 (The Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey, 2015)
United Arab Emirates Starting 2015. (Central Bank of the U.A.E., 2014)
Sources: Author’s own tabulation based on report.
Norzitah et al.
67
4.1.3 Central banks of dual banking system
From a selection of 11 countries with dual banking system, the survey noted that only 7 
countries namely Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Turkey and United Arab 
Emirates have produced Financial Stability Report/Review.  The central banks of these 
countries produce the report on a systematic frequency of yearly basis, for most countries 
except Indonesia, producing it on twice yearly.  The other 4 countries namely Bahrain, 
Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia does not have the report on website while Pakistan produces 
report in its own language, Urdu. The details of these reports and its frequency is tabulated in 
the Table 2, as below.
Table 2 Details of Financial Stability Report for countries with dual banking system
Country Name of regulatory institution / Name of reviewed report Frequency
Egypt The Central Bank of Egypt / Financial Stability Review 2015 Yearly
Indonesia Bank of Indonesia (central bank) / Financial Stability Review 2015 Twice yearly
Kuwait Central Bank of Kuwait / Financial Stability Report 2014 Yearly
Malaysia Central Bank of Malaysia / The Financial Stability and Payment 
System Report 2014
Yearly
Qatar Qatar Central Bank / Financial Stability Review 2014 Yearly
Turkey The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey / Financial Stability 
Report 2015
Yearly
United Arab Emirates Central Bank of the U.A.E. / Financial Stability Report 2014 Yearly
Sources: Author’s own tabulation based on report.
From this Financial Stability Report/Review, it is noted that most of central banks monitor 
several indicators for key indicators like capital, assets, liability, liquidity, profitability and 
sensitivity to foreign exchange and interest rates of the overall banking system. However, the 
central banks of Kuwait, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates are monitoring key indicators like 
assets, financing, deposit and capital of Islamic banking.  The information obtain from the 
reports is tabulated in the Table 3, as below.
Table 4 Survey of indicators used in Central Banks’ Financial Stability Report
Indicators CBE BI CBK CBM CBQ CBRT CBUAE IMF
Banking System
Capital ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Assets ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Liability ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Liquidity ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Profitability ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
Sensitivity to forex, interest rate ++ ++ ++
Islamic Banking System
Assets ++ ++ ++
Financing ++ ++ ++
Deposits ++ ++ ++
Capital ++ ++ ++
Source: Author’s own tabulation based on central banks’ report
Note: ++ denotes the use of several indicators + denotes the use of one indicator
In specific, the Qatar Central Bank is measuring the banking stability from several 
perspectives using Soundness Index, Fragility Index, Profitability Index, Liquidity Index and 
Inefficiency Index.(Qatar Central Bank, 2014). In term of financial stability indicators, the 
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Qatar Central Bank are monitoring capital adequacy ratio, tier-1 capital/asset, non-performing 
loans/total loans, NPL/capital, return on average asset, net interest margin, cost income ratio, 
loan to deposit ratio, short term asset/short term liability, consumption loan/ private sector 
loans, real estate loan/ private sector loans. (Qatar Central Bank, 2014).  On the other hand, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is measuring financial stability from several 
perspectives like global economy, global markets, domestic economy, domestic markets, 
balance of payments, public sector, corporate sector, household sector and banking sector.(The 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, 2015).
In addition to monitoring those important key indicators for both Islamic and conventional 
banks, some of these Central Banks also perform stress test to look at the impact of potential 
shocks to the specific areas.  From the review of the Financial Stability Report, only Bank of 
Indonesia, Central Bank of Malaysia, Qatar Central Bank and Central Bank of the United Arab 
Emirates (U.A.E). The Bank of Indonesia used 2 types of stress tests namely scenario-based 
analysis and sensitivity analysis.(Bank Indonesia, 2015). The scenario-based analysis is 
performed at macro level to measure bank capital resilience against economic moderation. This 
is to look at the market risk in term of interest rate, exchange rates and SBN prices. (Bank 
Indonesia, 2015). The sensitivity analysis is performed on impact of increasing non-
performing loans, that is, looking at the credit risk. (Bank Indonesia, 2015). The Central Bank 
of Malaysia applied almost similar stress tests, that is, broad scenario analyses, for spillovers 
and reversal of capital flows and sensitivity analyses, for loss estimation, severe correction, 
volatile in exchange rate and contagion risk from cross-boarder exposures.(Central Bank of 
Malaysia, 2014). In addition to this, Qatar Central Bank performed stress testing on credit risk, 
liquidity risk and market risk (interest rate).(Qatar Central Bank, 2014). Apart from this, 
Central Bank of the U.A.E. performed stress test based on 2 satellite models namely default 
rate satellite model (looking at the impact of a deteriorating economic environment on banks’ 
financial risk and solvency) and probability satellite model (looking at eh economic scenario on 
banks’ operating profit, before impairment charges.(Central Bank of the U.A.E., 2014)
4.2 Theoretical-based measure of bank stability
The theoretical-based measure is supported by a principle in finance called the Principle of 
Safety First. The principle and its development is discussed in the next section.
4.2.1 Empirical Evidence of Z-score as a proxy of measuring Bank Stability
The most popular measures of bank soundness and bank stability is z-score.  According to 
Rajhi (2013) the z-score is a measure of the distance-to-default, which measures the market 
value of a bank’s assets in relation to the book value of its liabilities. The z-score indicates the 
distance from insolvency combining accounting measures of profitability, leverage and 
volatility.(Rajhi, 2013). The z-score is inversely related to the probability of a bank’s 
insolvency, i.e., the probability that the value of its assets will become lower than the value of 
the debt which means that higher z-score corresponds to a lower risk of insolvency.(Rajhi, 
2013).
The theory of bank soundness or stability can be traced back as early as in 1952. It was 
developed by A.D. Roy based on a principle called as ‘Safety First’. The principle of ‘Safety 
First’ was developed based on Roy’s dissatisfaction over the simple rule of maximizing return 
and also his traumatic wartime experience.(Sullivan, 2011). The application of the principle of 
Safety First means that when having wide range of possible actions, including disasters, the 
gross return should not be less than some quantity.(Roy, 1952).  In the application of Principle 
of Safety First, Roy (1952) identified variables ‘m’ representing the quantity and ‘σ’ 
representing the standard deviation of m, are the only quantities given the individual’s 
knowledge of past. Roy (1952) identified there is a functional relationship between ‘m’ and 
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‘σ’, also calculate the probability of final return, using the calculation of ‘upper bound’ of this 
probability.
The z-score is popularized through an extending research on JH Boyd & Graham (1988) in 
their simulation of bank’s mergers and the risk associated to it. (J. H. Boyd, Graham, & Hewitt, 
1993). In this z-score measures the probability of bankruptcy of the simulated merger banks.(J. 
H. Boyd et al., 1993). Again, the previous work of Roy (1952) is not cited.  This is also 
noticeable in the work by Liang & Savage (1990), where it is referred as G-ratio to measure the 
probability of failure using the same formula, but there is no mentioned of extending work of 
early scholars like (Roy, 1952) or (J. H. Boyd & Graham, 1986). Z-score also was used in 
another research by Boyd. (J. H. Boyd & Runkle, 1993).
The subsequent research by De Nicolo (2000) cited and referred to the earlier researches 
by Roy (1952) and Boyd. It is stated in the paper as an extension of the research carried out by 
Boyd in 1993.(De Nicolo, 2000). Nevertheless, z is only referred to the risk of insolvency.(De 
Nicolo, 2000).  It is used to measure the insolvency risk in relation to the bank size, charters 
value and bank consolidation.(De Nicolo, 2000). The calculation is z = (µ + E/A)/ σ, where 
K=E/A is the equity to asset ratio, µ= π/A is the return on asset and σ is the standard deviation 
of ROA. (De Nicolo, 2000). 
Yeyati & Micco (2007) have cited all the previous works. Z-score and Z have been used 
interchangeable and used to calculate the probability of insolvency (as a proxy of banking 
stability) to the influence of competition, concentration and internationalization. (Yeyati & 
Micco, 2007). The calculation used is solvency risk which is the reverse of insolvency risk. 
This is represented by 1/z2 = σ / ROA+ CAR, where ROA is the return on asset, σ is the 
standard deviation of ROA and CAR is the capital asset ratio.(Yeyati & Micco, 2007).  This 
formula is similar to the previous studies. Yeyati & Micco (2007) founds that banking 
concentration did not decrease the competition but foreign penetration seems to head to a less 
competitive industry. Nevertheless, Yeyati & Micco (2007) revealed there is a positive 
relationship between banking sector stability and foreign penetration.
The modification and improvising of z-score is seen in the work by  John Boyd, Nicolò, & 
Jalal (2006) when they introduced time-varying measure of z-score.  The research used at least 
2 types of time varying z-score.  The first z is z-score is the moving mean and standard 
deviation of ROA calculated  for each period and secondly, the z-score is the “instantaneous” 
standard deviation estimates calculated over the full sample combining with current 
period.(John Boyd et al., 2006).  
From thereon, time-varying z-score is continued to be used.  Cihák & Hesse (2007) used 
standard deviation estimates of ROA that are calculated over the full sample and combining 
these with current period.  The work of Cihák & Hesse (2007) is more systematic with more 
variables like bank-specific variables, banking-industry specific variables, macroeconomic 
variables and also dummy variables (type of bank / market share of cooperative). The finding 
from this research is that cooperative banks have higher z-score than the commercial banks in 
the emerging market, suggesting the cooperative banks are more stable.
Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, & Tressel (2008) used time-varying z-score to study the 
relationship of banking supervision and regulation, in particular Basel Core Principles, and 
bank soundness.  Interestingly, z-score is a proxy calculation for bank soundness Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., (2008), instead of bank solvency, as in the previous case. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
(2008) used more econometric model namely Probit and OLS model and used more variables 
like return of average equity, return of average asset, Net Loan to total Asset, Log Total Asset, 
ETA, LA, Indexes, GDP, Inflation and others.  The finding suggests prioritization of banking 
supervision.(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008)
Due to the recent global financial crisis, it has become a great interest and draw enormous 
attention to the bank insolvency risk Rahman (2010) thus the z-score has become paramount 
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important than ever.(Strobel, 2011).  Rahman (2010) in her research noted that financing 
structures of the banks affect the risk exposure, bank’s profitability, capital structure decisions, 
degree of risk tolerance and economic performance.  According to Rahman (2010), there are 3 
methods other than market-based-risk measures namely Z-score, CAPM risk measures and 
Zrisk index.  Rahman (2010) in her research used Zrisk index with the rationale that it is most 
appropriate because Malaysian Islamic banks are relatively small and not publicly traded on the 
stock exchange.  However, a careful look at the formula of Zrisk index will reveal that it is 
very much similar to Z-score.  Rahman (2010) extending the work by Hannan & Hanweck 
(1988) where Zrisk risk is calculated as E(ROA) + CAP / σROA , where E(ROA) is the 
expected return on assets, CAP is the ratio of equity capital to total assets, and σROA is the 
standard deviation of ROA.  The usage of zrisk as a measure of risk is also noted in the 
research by Ahmad, Ariff, & Skully (2008).
Lepetit, Nys, Rous, & Tarazi (2008) investigate the relationship between bank risk and 
product diversification in the bank. In measuring the bank risk, Lepetit et al. (2008) used 2 
almost similar methods. The first method is a modification of the method by J. H. Boyd & 
Graham (1986) where it is known as ADZ or z-score and the ROE and the standard deviation 
of ROE is expressed in percentage.  The formula is ADZ= (100+average ROE) / SD ROE. The 
second method is known as ADZP, and it is extension of n Goyeau and Tarazi (1992) where 
the formula is ADZP=ADZP1+ADZP2=[AROA/SDROA]+average ROE / SD ROA.
Strobel (2011) improved the measure of probability of insolvency, that is the z-score by 
identifying the downward biasness in using the (weighted) average of Z-scores thus a potential 
flaw measuring of systemic soundness. The downward bias was eliminated if the percentiles of 
bank-level Z-scores are weighted by total bank assets.(Strobel, 2011). Lepetit & Strobel (2013)
makes a comparison of 5 different time-varying z-score, developed in the previous researches 
and suggest the best alternatives. The time-varying Z-score measures was further improvise 
using a simple root mean squared error criterion where it uses mean and standard deviation 
estimates of the return on assets calculated over full samples combined with current values of 
the capital-asset ratio, and is thus straightforward to implement.(Lepetit & Strobel, 2013). The 
advantages of this measure of time-varying z-score said to be more straightforward and does 
not drop initial observations. (Lepetit & Strobel, 2013)
Bourkhis & Nabi (2013) and Beck et al. (2013) used bank’s soundness focusing on Z-score 
ratio as the indicator for bank’s soundness.  According to Bourkhis & Nabi (2013), Z-score 
ratio is an important measure for bank soundness because it is inversely related to the 
probability of bank’s insolvency.  Z-score is denoted as follows: Z=(μ+K)/σ where μ denotes 
the bank's average return on assets (ROA), K the equity capital in percentage of total assets and 
σ is the standard deviation of the ROA as a proxy for return volatility. (Bourkhis & Nabi, 
2013). The probability of insolvency is defined as the probability that losses π exceed equity E 
i.e. Therefore, an increase of the Z-score is equivalent to a decrease of the upper bound of the 
insolvency risk. Under the assumption of bank's return normality, the Z-score can be 
interpreted as the number of standard deviations below the mean by which profits would have 
to fall in order to deplete equity.  The bank’s soundness is measured by Z-score that is the 
average return on asset plus equity divided assets divided by standard deviation of return on 
assets (Beck et al., 2013).  Hsieh, Chen, & Lee (2013) used z-score, and called it z-index as one 
of the proxies for bank stability.  The z-index is actually calculated manually by the author
based on data from Bankscope, using the formual z-index=ROA+ E/TA / σROA  where, ROA is 
the ratio of return to total assets, E/TA is the equity percent of assets, and σROA is standard 
deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility, using a 3-year moving average. 
(Hsieh et al., 2013). The bank-level Z-index means a larger value indicates higher stability and 
less overall bank risk (Hsieh et al., 2013).
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5 Conclusions
As a conclusion from review of literatures and practice of regulators, it is noted that there 
is no standardised acceptable definition and framework of financial and banking stability.  
Nevertheless, few researches acknowledges that the financial stability is by-products of 
stability of other sectors in financial system, namely, banking system, equity, debt and other. In 
the academic researches, the researchers tends to use z-score as a measure of bank stability, 
which measures the distance from insolvency relative to volatility, profitability and leverage.
This is due to simple and accurate measurement of bank stability. In linking banking stability 
in practice, a study of report produced by central banks of dual banking system reveals that 
only some central banks monitor the stability of Islamic banking while most focus on overall 
system, that is, conventional banks. 
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